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Reflections on a footnote: implications for the 
study of emotions in animals1
Emma Otta* 
Universidade de São Paulo, Instituto de Psicologia, Departamento de Psicologia Experimental. São Paulo, SP, Brasil
A footnote added to the article “Affective conscious-
ness: Core emotional feelings in animals and humans”, 
published in the journal Consciousness and Cognition 
(Panksepp, 2005), led me to write this essay in order to 
discuss the study of emotions in animals and implications 
of this type of research for understanding human psycho-
logical processes.
The text of the Footnote (FN) was originally 
submitted by Jaak Panksepp to the editor of Trends in 
Neuroscience as a comment to the article “Parsing reward” 
(Berridge & Robinson, 2003) immediately after it was pub-
lished. However, the text was refused for publication, and 
the ideas were disqualified as more appropriate for an “idle 
talk”. In my point of view, the FN provides important ideas 
for our reflection, and should not be sent to an “inactive 
file”. “Idle talks” may promote lateral thinking, and cre-
ative ideas arise in informal conversations among scien-
tists. Such ideas may later be developed as experiments in 
the sober environment of research laboratories, and result 
in articles accepted for publication. However, I believe that 
a debate on this FN (reproduced further in this article) de-
serves to be brought to a journal such as Psicologia USP 
[USP Psychology], which has a leadership role in the aca-
demic scenario of Brazilian psychology, publishing signifi-
cant debates in areas of frontier of human and biological 
sciences. I hesitated to write this essay for several reasons, 
including the fact that the episode occurred a few years 
1 I thank Prof. Nicolas Gérard Chaline, from the Department of Experi-
mental Psychology of the Institute of Psychology of the University of 
São Paulo, for the French version of the article abstract; Prof. Andrés 
Eduardo Aguirre Antúnez, from the Department of Clinical Psychology, 
for the Spanish version; and Prof. Russell David Hamer of the Depart-
ment of Psychology at Florida Atlantic University, for the revision of the 
abstract in English.
* Correspondent author: emmaotta@gmail.com
ago, but I decided to write it because I believe that the in-
volved core issues are important and remain current.
The suggestive Footnote 
My reading of this paper was that the authors ad-
vocated the position that animals exhibit only affective be-
haviors, whereas humans have true affective experiences 
because of their cortical enrichments. Within a few days of 
publication of the piece of Berridge and Robinson, I sub-
mitted the following letter (references deleted) as a letter 
to the editor. The authors declined to respond (I assume 
because taking a position on such topics can leave you 
branded with the Scarlet letter of Anthropomorphism), and 
the editor wrote back about half a year later: ‘‘Please accept 
my sincere apologies… for your monumental patience… I 
do not feel that a letter exchange in TINS is the right place 
for expression of your ideas… I think that your ideas on 
this matter need to be raised in the discussion section after 
a relevant conference talk or in the bar.”
Berridge and Robinson’s reconceptualization of 
dopamine-facilitated ‘‘brain reward’’ into wanting (uncon-
scious desire?) vs. liking has been a welcomed meme. It 
corresponds to classic appetitive approach and consum-
matory reward concept long accepted by psychologists, in-
cluding sensory-perceptual biasing and cognitive linkages. 
A complementary solution to paradoxes associated with 
brain stimulation reward was the conceptualization of a do-
pamine driven appetitive SEEKING/expectancy emotional 
system – a ‘‘goad without a goal’’ that energizes foraging 
and mediates anticipatory states. Such emotional/motiva-
tional urges have many attributes, including sensory-per-
ceptual biasing and cognitive linkages. Incentive salience 
may reflect conditioned cues getting easily into both the 
emotional action and the cognitive channel-control com-
ponents of this widespread instinctual-emotional-learning 
Abstract: A footnote (FN) originally submitted as a comment to the article “Parsing Reward” led me to write this essay. 
The comment was rejected by the editor of a prestigious scientific journal in the area of behavioral neuroscience 
with the suggestion that it would be more appropriate for an “idle talk”. I believe that the core issues involved are 
important to address explicitly in a debate within the broad domain of the frontiers of human and biological sciences. 
The protagonists involved in the didactic episode of the FN, whose articles and books I have been reading over the 
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system. Comparable emotional action systems are critical 
for diverse states of feelings that help to clarify the multi-
dimensional concepts of reward and punishment, which 
encapsulate our meager understanding of the intrinsic val-
ue structures of the brain. To properly clarify affects, we 
must psychobiologically study many emotions and sensory 
rewards, as well as bodily regulatory/motivational urges 
(e.g., thirst and hunger). Affective feelings in animals – is-
sues that B&R have strategically, perhaps neo-dualistically, 
minimized – are likely to be true aspects of animate na-
ture. An ontological key question, finally neuro-epistemo-
logically workable, is the extent to which arousal of core 
emotional systems, like the SEEKING/Wanting system, 
is experienced in humans and other animals. Since Freud, 
it has been increasingly recognized that felt experience 
stews within an enormous unconscious neural caldron. 
However, is it culturally and scientifically wise for us to 
deny, ignore or minimize the probable existence of neuro-
affective states in other mammals when so much evidence 
suggests that they have such experiences? All humans af-
firm that affective experiences are critical for the quality 
of life. Considering the weight of relevant evidence, there 
is no principled reason (only our desire for proof – which 
does not exist in science) to marginalize affective experi-
ence in the neuro-mental lives of animals. Considering the 
abundant data from bodily expressive, place-preference, 
and vocal measures, a scientifically coherent working 
hypothesis, quite capable of generating testable predic-
tions, is that other mammals do have affective feelings 
functionally similar to our own. Even though we have no 
access to the precise nature of their associated cognitions 
and qualia, for optimal progress, it is reasonable to enter-
tain a role for neuroaffective core processes for scientifi-
cally understanding what animals do. If basic affects arise 
largely from evolutionarily conserved core neurodynamics 
in all mammals, we can finally fathom the nature of ho-
mologous value structures that move humans. This criti-
cally important step may allow us to better conceptualize 
brain–mind imbalances in psychiatric disorders. Concepts 
like SEEKING/wanting are promising starts, but let us not 
make subcortical affect-generating networks unconscious 
prematurely. The evidence for that remains weak. In fact, 
studies like that of Lamb and colleagues say little about 
unconscious motivations. Why reaffirm, even implicitly, 
the Cartesian sin of granting so little experienced life to 
other animals? Abundant evidence indicates that raw affec-
tive experiences are critically linked to the neurodynam-
ics of sub-neocortical limbic networks (homologous in all 
mammals), and not to neocortical re-representations that 
abundantly regulate and refine emotions. At what level of 
the neuroaxis do the deeply unconscious aspects of many 
brain functions blend with those that are experienced? We 
do not know. Affectively, the neocortex may be more un-
conscious than sub-neocortical limbic regions. As essential 
as learning is for navigating complex environments, well 
conceptualized by B&R, it is unparsimonious to specu-
late that core values are only experienced when read out 
by higher cognitions. Despite our disciplinary aversion to 
spooky neuropsychological constructs, feelings may arise 
more directly from brain emotional, motivational, and sen-
sory systems in action, even in rats. Finally, it should be 
noted that psychological processes may emerge as much 
from motor-action processes (SEEKING) as from sensory-
cognitive processes (wanting and liking)2.
Current scenario and historical background
The protagonists involved in the didactic episode 
of the FN, whose articles and books I have been reading 
over the years, are leaders in the field of neuroscience. But 
regardless of who is involved, what is interesting for us is 
to contextualize the episode and to think about it in terms 
of potential prospects.
Ethology has a history of research on communi-
cation and expression of emotion in animals, inspired by 
Charles Darwin’s (1872/2000) classic “The expression 
of the emotions in man and animals.” However, it is no-
table that many ethologists have difficulty in answering 
the questions: “Do animals experience emotions?”, “Does 
your research animal has emotions?”. I interpret this dif-
ficulty as a result of specialization of the area. As a result 
of its development over the past decades, ethology has be-
come increasingly specialized. Among the new specialties 
that emerged are behavioral ecology, behavioral genetics, 
neuroethology, animal cognition, applied ethology, hu-
man ethology and evolutionary psychology. Factual and 
theoretical progress has been made in each of these new 
specialties. However, there was also a reduction of com-
munication among specialties. The history of science is 
replete with examples of controversies due to the diffi-
culty of a group of scientists to understand the terms and 
concepts that another group uses. During his stay at the 
Institute for Advanced Studies at the University of São 
Paulo in 2013 and 2014, Jerry Hogan, Emeritus Professor of 
the Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, was 
writing the book “The study of behavior”, aimed to provide 
a theoretical framework for studying human and animal 
behavior which integrates concepts and results of the vari-
ous areas of ethology. Texts that contribute to increase the 
communication among scientists from various specialties, 
favoring new insights as a result of this facilitated com-
munication, are needed. It was also with this objective 
that we organized, in 2013, the XXXI Annual Meeting of 
Ethology, whose theme was “The Founding of Brazilian 
Ethology and Future Prospects”, honoring Professor Walter 
Hugo Cunha de Andrade, founder of Ethology in Brazil, as 
part of an effort to recover our history and reflect on the 
future. This was also the motivation that led me to write 
this essay. 
While writing, I remembered that a classic article of 
the pioneer of Brazilian ethology was rejected for publication 
2 References deleted from the mentioned letter; they are available on re-
quest. Panksepp (2005)
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by the editors of Insectes Sociaux. At the invitation of Cesar 
Ades, the text was published in Revista de Etologia. It was 
republished as part of Lessons from Alameda Glete: collec-
tion of texts by Walter Hugo Cunha, pioneer of ethology in 
Brazil (Otta, Ribeiro & Bussab, 2013). In the chapter “The 
originality of Walter Hugo de Andrade Cunha: spontaneous 
generation”, Fernando Ribeiro describes what happened:
He sent an article with some of his findings … to 
the journal Insectes Sociaux. The article was reject-
ed because one of the referees did not understand 
what he read. The alarm pheromones and marked 
trails were important discoveries and they were in 
vogue. They are social features, communication 
tools. Using the alarm pheromone, the ant sends a 
signal that can trigger panic responses and disrupt 
their conspecifics’ behavior. But Walter Hugo’s 
article went far beyond this simple statement. 
Furthermore, it originally suggests the creation of 
a taxonomy for panic reactions. So, sadly, a crucial 
milestone of the nascent Brazilian Ethology had 
its publication rejected … in 1974. The article was 
entitled ‘On the panic reactions of ants to a nest-
mate crushed: a Contribution to the psychoethol-
ogy of fear.’ I suppose that the title, referring to a 
psychoethology, ‘the psychoethology’, may have 
caused a panic reaction in the journal’s referee, as 
this term was also new, almost unprecedented. In 
2004, Cesar Ades took the valuable initiative to 
publish the article in the Brazilian journal Revista 
de Etologia. (pp. 133-140)
Behaviorism has a history of disregarding the study of 
emotions. Burrhus Frederic Skinner (1953) once stated, “The 
‘emotions’ are excellent examples of the fictional causes to 
which we commonly attribute behavior” (p. 160). Psychology 
should concern with the observable behavior of people and 
animals, not with unobservable events that take place in their 
minds. Any explanation of the behavior of organisms should 
be sought in the environment, based on general learning 
principles from the study of a small number of animal spe-
cies, usually rats and pigeons in controlled laboratory stud-
ies. Little attention was given to differences among species 
(Beach, 1950). Evidence of instinctive drift, i.e., the tendency 
of an animal to revert to instinctive behaviors that interfered 
with a conditioned response, was generally ignored (Breland 
& Breland, 1961). The investigation of the intrinsic dynamics 
of the “black box” was considered unnecessary, and the study 
of its inputs and outputs was enough. There was little inter-
action between areas. When asked during his visit at USP: 
“Have you not read Tinbergen3?”, Fred Keller4 answered with 
another question: “Who is Tinbergen? A poet?”
3 The ethologist Niko Tinbergen was one of the winners of the Nobel Prize 
in Physiology/Medicine in 1973 for his research on the organization and 
elicitation of individual and social behavior patterns in animals.
4 Interview with Professor Walter Hugo Cunha de Andrade made by Ce-
sar Ades, Marina Massimi and Roberto de Andrade Martins in May 7 
Box 1. In response to Jaak Panksepp’s letter (1990, pp. 142-147) 
on September 7, 1987, Professor Skinner replied on September 
22, 1987:
Dear Dr. Panksepp, 
As I pointed out in a paper I gave at the recent 
meeting of the American Psychological Association, a 
behavioral account has two unavoidable gaps – between 
stimulus and response, and between reinforcement and 
a resulting change in behavior. Those gaps can be filled 
only with the instruments and techniques of neurology. 
A science of behavior need not wait until neurology has 
done so. A complete account is no doubt highly desirable 
but the neurology is not what the behavior really is; the 
two sciences deal with separate subject matters. A third 
discipline may very well wish to deal with how the two 
can be brought together, but that is not my field. 
Yours sincerely,
B. F. Skinner
The Figure 1, adapted from Panksepp (2011a), il-
lustrates the answers that can be given to the question “Do 
animals have emotions?” and potential errors arising from 
these answers. Most of the twentieth century was spent be-
lieving the lower right quadrant would be the right place to 
be philosophically, avoiding type I errors, i.e., concluding 
that something exists when in fact it does not. Panksepp 
invites researchers to situate themselves in the upper left 
quadrant, thus avoiding type II errors, i.e., the inability to 
detect a real phenomenon, due to false beliefs or inadequate 
methods to assess its presence.






















Figure 1. Answers to the question “Do animals have emotions?” 
and potential errors associated with them. (Adapted from Pank-
sepp, 2011)
I first became acquainted with the research work of 
Kent Berridge, coordinator of The Affective Neuroscience 
and Biopsychology Lab, Department of Psychology, 
1990. Available at: http://www.cle.unicamp.br/arquivoshistoricos/Wal-
ter_Hugo/ewalter.pdf
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University of Michigan, in 2004, and since then I have been 
reading his publications (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2010, 
2011, 2013). When he published “Motivation concepts in 
behavioral neuroscience” (2004), we suggested the read-
ing of this article to our undergraduate psychology students 
of the course “Motivation and Emotion” at the Institute of 
Psychology of the University of São Paulo. Cesar Ades and 
I talked about the resurgence of motivation as a significant 
issue for behavioral neuroscience. The article emphasizes 
the need for motivation concepts combined with behav-
ioral neuroscience research to understand how the brain 
generates psychological processes and behavioral patterns 
helping neuroscience models to explain more than mere 
fragments of behavior.
There still remain today many contemporary coun-
terparts to the behaviorist of the last century, in 
the form of neuroscience reductionists. Some of 
these reductionists still adhere to a basically logi-
cal positivist or extreme materialist conviction that 
all behavior must be explained without recourse 
to psychological levels of concepts and, instead, 
solely in terms of directly observed physical events: 
neurons, neuro-transmitters, etc. Such extreme re-
ductionism is a vestige of 20th century positivist 
tendencies toward explanatory concreteness at all 
costs and, though now relatively rare, it has not yet 
disappeared. For modern reductionists, just as for 
traditional behaviorists, motivation is a difficult 
explanatory concept because it cannot be directly 
observed as a physical event. (p. 185)
Trying to explain how the brain controls motivated 
behavior without motivational concepts is like try-
ing to understand what your computer does without 
concepts of software. Erich von Holst (1963), an 
important early behavioral neuroscientist, empha-
sized that we need what he called ‘level-adequate’ 
concepts to understand how brains control behav-
ior. Level adequate means an explanation that ade-
quately matches the level of complexity of the thing 
we are trying to explain. Concepts of hedonic reac-
tion, incentive motivation, homeostatic reflex, hier-
archy, heterarchy, etc., are all level adequate in the 
sense that they are the simplest possible concepts 
to adequately capture the crucial corresponding as-
pects of what brains actually do. (p. 205)
In The Affective Neuroscience and Biopsychology 
Lab research, studies on brain systems (hedonic hotspots) 
involved in the hedonic impact of a stimulus, such as sweet 
taste, and the incentive salience or motivational incentive 
value of the reward are conducted. There is a special inter-
est in the analysis of reward in its specific psychological 
components: (1) learning (including implicit and explicit 
knowledge produced by associative conditioning and by 
cognitive processes); (2) affect or emotion (implicit “lik-
ing” and conscious pleasure) and (3) motivation (Incentive 
Salience or cue-triggered “wanting” and cognitive incen-
tives or explicit desires). The challenge is to identify how 
different brain circuits mediate different psychological 
components of reward, and how these components inter-
act. There is interest in the potential applications of this re-
search to drug addiction in humans, rational and irrational 
choices and conscious and unconscious emotion involved 
in everyday pleasures and desires5.
Figure 2, adapted from Berridge and Robinson’s 
(2003) article “Parsing Reward” which triggered the epi-
sode of FN, distinguishes explicit and implicit dimensions 
of the psychological components of reward. The explicit as-
pects are consciously experienced as explicit desire, plea-
sure and hedonic expectation of reward, while the implicit 
aspects are unconscious, but can significantly influence 
behavior in the form of implicit incentive salience, “liking” 
and habits.
I first became acquainted with the research work 
of Jaak Panksepp, Professor Emeritus, Department of 
Psychology of Bowling Green State University and 
Washington State University, in 1998, and since then I 
have been reviewing his publications (e.g., Panksepp, 1992, 
1998, 2004, 2005; Panksepp & Biven, 2012). We sug-
gested the reading of his books “Affective Neuroscience: 
The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions” and 
“The Archaeology of Mind: Neuroevolutionary Origins 
of Human Emotions” to our undergraduate psychology 
students of the course “Motivation and Emotion” at the 
Institute of Psychology of the University of São Paulo, 
considering that it is in line with the psychoethological 
perspective of the course. Cesar and I talked about rats’ 
“laughter” – fast 50 kHz ultrasonic vocalizations (<0.3-s) 
that the human ear cannot identify, but which can be re-
corded and submitted to spectrographic analysis – in posi-
tive affective circumstances such as rough-and-tumble play 
(Burgdorf et al, 2008; Knutson, Burgdorf & Panksepp; 
1998, 2002; Brudzynski & Pniak, 2002), mating (Burgdorf 
et al., 2008), in response to drugs of abuse, e.g., amphet-
amine (Burgdorf et al., 2001; Thompson et al., 2006), and 
anticipation of rewards (Burgdorf, Knutson & Panksepp, 
2000). We also talked about rats’ “whimper” – long 22 
kHz ultrasonic vocalizations (> 0.3-s) – in negative emo-
tional circumstances, such as an encounter with a predator 
(Blanchard, Blanchard, Agullana, & Weiss, 1991), defeat 
by a conspecific (Thomas, Takahashi, Barfield, 1983; 
Tornatzky & Miezek, 1994), withdrawal from drugs such 
as alcohol, benzodiazepines, opiates and psychostimulants 
(Covington & Miczek, 2003; Ma et al., 2010; Vivian et 
al., 1994), and anticipation of aversive stimulation (Choi 
& Brown, 2003; Lee, Choi, Kim & Brown, 2001). The 
ultrasonic vocalizations of 50 kHz express a positive, ap-
petitive state and serve as a social affiliative signal, while 
the ultrasonic vocalizations of 22 kHz express a negative, 
aversive state, and serve as an alarm signal (Brudzynski, 
5 The interested reader can find representative articles and supplementary 
materials on the site http://www-personal.umich.edu/~berridge/
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Figure 2. Explicit and implicit psychological components of reward involving motivation, affect and learning dimensions. Adapted from 
Robinson and Berridge (2003)
2013). Rats self-administer playback vocalizations of 50-
kHz and avoid playback vocalizations of 22 kHz (Burgdorf 
et al., 2008). Parsana et al. (2012) showed that ultrasonic 
vocalizations of 50 kHz lead to activation of the amygdala 
whereas ultrasonic vocalizations of 22 kHz lead to deacti-
vation of the amygdala.
Panksepp (2011b) postulates seven primary pro-
cess emotional networks, situated in subcortical regions of 
the brain – seeking, rage, fear, lust, care, grief and play 
– that can serve as emotional endophenotypes6 for psycho-
pathological problems. Through electrical stimulation in 
old subcortical regions of the brain (ESB), powerful emo-
tional unconditioned responses can be elicited in animals. 
Experimentally, giving opportunity for self-stimulation, 
it is possible to show that the animals “like” or “dislike” 
the ESB that evokes unconditioned instinctual emotional 
behaviors.
Neuroanatomically, all primal systems are situ-
ated subcortically, and consist of large transverse 
networks that interconnect midbrain circuits con-
centrated in midbrain regions, such as the PAG and 
ventral tegmental area (VTA), with various basal 
ganglia nuclei, such as amygdala and nucleus ac-
cumbens as well as cingulate and medial frontal 
6 Endophenotypes are neuroanatomical, neurophysiological, neurochemi-
cal, emotional, motivational, cognitive or simple response tendencies.
cortex, via pathways that run through the lateral 
and medial hypothalamus and medial thalamus. 
Each system has abundant descending and ascend-
ing components that work together in a coordinated 
fashion to generate various instinctual emotional 
behaviors, as well as the raw feelings normally 
associated with those behaviors. The raw affects 
engendered by these systems are ancestral memo-
ries (instincts) that promote survival – they antici-
pate the kinds of survival needs that all organisms 
require to successfully navigate the world. They 
also help mediate the poorly understood brain pro-
cesses called “reinforcement” in traditional behav-
ioristic learning theory, based upon the temporal 
association of external stimuli with the uncondi-
tioned affective responses of the nervous system. 
(p. 1797-1798)
Conclusions
What might we gain by accepting the invitation of 
Jaak Panksepp to leave the predominant position of denial 
of affective states in animals and to adopt a position that 
attributes the experience of these states to them?
There is now a solid observational database to draw 
the inference of affective states in animals. Researchers 
such as Jane Goodall (1990, 2000), Marc Bekoff (2000, 
2002, 2007, 2009) and Cynthia Moss (2000), based on 
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decades of experience studying the behavior of chimpan-
zees, canines and elephants, respectively, have no doubt in 
asserting that animals have rich emotional lives, agreeing 
with Jaak Panksepp. In his chapter “Animal emotions and 
animal sentience and why they matter: blending ‘science 
sense’ with common sense, compassion and heart” pub-
lished in the book Animals, Ethics and Trade, Marc Bekoff 
(2006) argues that with respect to the emotional lives of an-
imals, the skeptics often use double standards and require 
more evidence than in other areas. Since affective experi-
ence is private, it is easy to say that you can never be sure 
that animals have emotions and to declare the case closed.
Nonetheless, a cursory glance at many studies in 
animal behavior, behavioral ecology, neurobiology 
and biomedicine shows clearly that only rarely do we 
ever come to know everything about the questions at 
hand, yet this does not stop us from making accurate 
predictions concerning what an individual is likely to 
do in a given situation or from suggesting the use of 
a wide variety of treatments to help alleviate differ-
ent diseases. This is all in the patent absence of in-
controvertible proof, in the absence of total certainty, 
something that few scientists can ever offer. (p. 34)
Consider the following examples on the double 
standard of proof: 1) At a symposium after Cynthia Moss 
presented her work on the behavior of elephants, includ-
ing a wonderful video, a leader of the National Science 
Foundation asked “How do you know that these animals 
are feeling the emotions you claim they are?”, and Cynthia 
replied “How you know they are not?”; 2) Ray Dolan (2002) 
published the article “Emotion, cognition, and behavior” 
in the prestigious journal Science. He is a neuroscientist, 
coordinates a Center of Neuroimaging, and studies the in-
fluence of emotion on decision making by humans. In his 
article, he concludes “More than any other species, we are 
beneficiaries and victims of a wealth of emotional experi-
ence.” (p. 1191). We could ask Ray Dolan: “How do you 
know?” It is possible that other animals experience more 
vivid emotions than us. Why are we so special, why do we 
feel so deeply and other animals do not? We are led to think 
about speciesism, a term coined by psychologist Richard 
D. Ryder in 1970, which refers to the discrimination com-
monly practiced by man against other species and ignoring 
or underestimating the similarities between the discrimi-
nator and those discriminated against (Ryder, 1989, 2004).
The theory of Affective Neuroscience of Jaak 
Panksepp is based on the premise that animals have af-
fective feelings, and this capability makes animal models 
so important for neuroscience to advance its understanding 
of the neural basis of human emotions. He proposes an in-
novative research agenda, which was not yet absorbed into 
the mainstream of neuroscience, inviting for an increased 
dialogue among psychoethologists, behavior analysts and 
neuroscientists, an increased activity of Laboratories of 
Animal Behavior, with the development and improvement 
of behavioral indices and theoretical models. Difficulties 
in communication between scientists exist, as illustrated 
by the episode of the FN, but occasional problems can be 
overcome in a collective perspective.
I would dare to paraphrase Kent Berridge (2004) 
and say that
Emotion7 concepts are needed to understand the 
brain, just as brain concepts are needed to under-
stand emotion. Emotion concepts can aid behavioral 
neuroscience to live up to its potential of providing 
brain-based explanations of emotional behavior in 
real life. Without them, neuroscience models would 
remain oversimplified fragments, removed from the 
behavioral reality they purport to explain. (p. 205) 
I mention as a Brazilian example of the research 
agenda of Affective Neuroscience a study of Newton 
Canteras, my colleague of the Institute of Biomedical 
Sciences, University of São Paulo (Gross & Canteras, 
2012), recently published in Nature Reviews Neuroscience. 
He told me that he had scientific conversations about fear 
with Cesar Ades. This study illustrates how a basic animal 
research can offer insights to improve our understanding of 
fear and anxiety in humans, expanding the traditional view 
of fear derived from animal studies that use conditioning to 
discrete painful cues to encompass a wider range of etho-
logical responses to fear stimuli. The study showed that fear 
of pain (footshock), fear of predators (cat/cat’s smell) and 
fear of aggressive conspecifics in rats are processed in three 
independent neural pathways that include subnuclei of the 
amygdala, hypothalamus and periaqueductal gray (PAG ). 
It is possible to intervene specifically in each of these cir-
cuits. For example, rats with lesions in the fear of predator 
circuit do not show fear of cats or the smell of cats. Lesions 
of the pain circuit prevent the expression of conditioned fear 
of feetshock but do not interfere with the expression of fear 
of a predator. There is a notable anatomical preservation 
of the amygdala, hypothalamus and medial periaqueductal 
gray matter (PAG) involved in the processing of fear, sug-
gesting that similar circuits for different classes of fear ex-
ist in other mammals, including humans. Knowing the fear 
circuit predominantly affected could help to develop psy-
chotherapeutic and pharmacological interventions which 
will be more specific than interventions based on theoreti-
cal views that conceptualize fear as a unitary psychologi-
cal construct. In humans, there is evidence that electrical 
stimulation of the dorsal part of the ventromedial nucleus 
of the hypothalamus (dmVMH) elicits a sensation of panic 
and impending death (Wilent, 2010) and that stimulation 
of the dorsolateral PAG causes a feeling of uncertainty and 
being chased by someone (Amano et al., 1982). Perhaps un-
derlying panic attacks, which cause so much suffering to 
many people, is a circuit of predator fear.
7 Emotion was used in the place of motivation.
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In my point of view, Jaak Panksepp’s Affective 
Neuroscience is different from what is done both in neu-
roethology and in behavioral neuroscience, in spite of over-
lapping areas of interest.
Neuroethology is a specialty which aims to under-
stand the neural basis of the natural behavior of animal spe-
cies. Research in this area began in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. The International Society for Neuroethology (ISN) 
was created in Germany in 19818. Behavioral neuroscience 
studies the brain systems underlying normal and abnormal 
human behavior, and use non-human animals models. The 
International Behavioral Neuroscience Society (IBNS) 
was founded in 1992 in the USA9. In Brazil, neuroetholo-
gists are members of the Brazilian Society of Ethology 
(SBEt) and behavioral neuroscientists are members of the 
Brazilian Society for Neuroscience and Behavior (SBNeC).
The Affective Neuroscience (AN), created by 
Panksepp in 1992, is the study of the neural mechanisms of 
emotion, with emphasis on the study of animal models to 
understand the basic human emotional systems and human 
affective disorders. AN considers that emotional feelings 
are closely related to instinctive animal processes. The ob-
jective is to study the primary process feelings and brain 
mechanisms in animals aiming at understanding basic hu-
man psychological processes.
Through an understanding of these primary-pro-
cess systems, we may eventually be able to craft 
a scientifically sound general definition of emo-
tions. These systems sustain their integrity in de-
corticated animals (Merker, 2007; Panksepp et al., 
1994), but they probably control and are controlled 
by various higher brain processes that are hard to 
analyze psychologically in animal models, just like 
the lower subcortical systems are almost impos-
sible to study, ethically, in any detail in humans. 
There is so much functional work left to be done on 
these systems, especially with regard to preclinical 
modeling of emotional distress, but relatively little 
is being conducted. This could be deemed regret-
table because a cogent argument is readily made for 
the likelihood that these systems are of critical im-
portance for all psychiatric disorders characterized 
by affective turmoil (Panksepp, 2006). Indeed, by 
taking these affective systems seriously, we may be 
heading toward more precise animal models of psy-
chiatric disorders. (Panksepp, 2011b, p. 1798)
According to Panksepp (2010, 2011a,b, 2012), the 
primary process affective mind arose earlier in evolution 
than our sophisticated cognitive minds, and mammals 
share this basic process involving sensory, homeostatic 
8 Interested readers can access the topics that are being discussed in 
ISN’s meetings on the site http://psfebus.allenpress.com/eBusISNE/
HOME.aspx
9 The interested reader can access the topics that are being discussed in the 
meetings of IBNS on the site http://www.ibnsconnect.org/.
and emotional affects (Table 1). Emotional feelings (af-
fects) and subcortical regions of the brain underlying 
them, which are anatomically, neurochemically and 
functionally similar in all mammals studied, inform 
how organisms are performing with regard to important 
survival tasks. Primary process intensely experienced 
emotional feelings constitute the basis for secondary pro-
cesses learning and memory mechanisms, and for tertia-
ry processes involving higher order cognitive functions 
of the Mind/Brain.
The basic survival tool kit, with which nature pres-
ents organisms, is refined by basic learning mechanisms 
(secondary processes) and cognitions/higher-order think-
ing. The upward arrows in Table 1 indicate “bottom up” in-
fluences, and descendant arrows, “top down” regulations. 
The primary processes have a significant influence on the 
learning mechanisms (i.e., the development of Pavlovian 
conditioned responses and instrumental conditioned re-
sponses) and motivate superior decision-making processes. 
In this perspective, the cognitive apparatus is subservi-








Cognitive executive functions: thinking 
and planning commonly guided by affect















Sensory affects (pleasurable and  
unpleasurable/disgusting feelings  
triggered by exteroceptive stimuli) 
Homeostatic affects (triggered by 
interoceptive stimuli: hunger, thirst, etc.)
Emotional affects (emotion action  
systems; intentions –in-actions)
Figure 3. Operation of the mind/brain with embedded layers of “bottom up” 
and “top down” regulation. Adapted from Pankesepp (2011, 2012) 
At birth, the neocortex is largely a tabula rasa, 
and its functions are programmed into equipotential tis-
sues, which initially resemble RAM (Random Access 
Memory). But after learning how to regulate affect (e.g., 
from finding food when hungry to control impulsivity 
when angry), higher mental processes arise and are gradu-
ally transformed into Programmable Read Only Memories 
(PROMs). From this perspective, the emphasis shifts from 
“I think, therefore I am” to “I feel therefore I think”. 
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Within such a view, many of the presuppositions 
of psychology, cognitive science, and neurosci-
ence may be turned on their collective heads. 
Many of our higher mental abilities are com-
paratively unconscious, meaning unexperienced, 
for instance, key aspects of cognitive brain func-
tions such as the basic mechanisms of learning 
and memory. In contrast, the affective founda-
tions are intensely experienced – since they can 
serve as ‘rewards’ and ‘punishments’ in learning 
– albeit those psychological states are, at times, 
hard to translate into words, symbols which 
more effectively describe external sensory-per-
ceptual abilities than emotional ones … Without 
a solid cross-species neuroscientific foundation, 
it may be difficult to make sense of the subse-
quent mental developments of our species – e.g., 
the way our cognitive apparatus is often subser-
vient to our emotional feelings. This is inherent 
in the nested hierarchical view of brain function. 
(Panksepp, 2011)
There is a notable lack of studies on primary pro-
cesses, since human psychological research focused on 
the study of executive cognitive functions or learning 
(classical and instrumental conditioning). Understanding 
affective tools for life and learning that they exist at the 
level of primary processes, we can better comprehend 
how the higher mental processes operate (Oliva  et al., 
2006).
I hope the readers will feel encouraged to continue 
the discussion of the issues raised in this paper written be-
cause of a Footnote. If the scientific debate is prolonged, it 
can proceed without demerit as an ‘Idle talk’.
Reflexões a partir de uma nota de rodapé: implicações para o estudo de emoções em animais 
Resumo: Uma nota de rodapé (NR), originalmente submetida como um comentário ao artigo “Parsing Reward”, me levou a 
escrever este ensaio. O comentário foi rejeitado pelo editor de um renomado periódico científico na área de neurociências com 
a sugestão de que seria mais apropriado para uma “conversa de bar”. Acredito que as questões essenciais envolvidas sejam 
significativas para um debate na área de fronteira das ciências humanas e biológicas. Os protagonistas envolvidos no didático 
episódio da NR, cujos artigos e livros tenho acompanhado nos últimos anos, são lideranças na área de neurociências. Neste 
ensaio contextualizo o episódio historicamente e o discuto em termos de perspectivas potenciais para a etologia, a psicologia 
e a neurociência.
Palavras-chave: emoção, animais, etologia, psicologia, neurociência. 
Réflexions sur une note de bas de page: implications pour leétude des emotions chez les animaux 
Résumé: Une note de bas de page (NBP) initialement soumise comme un commentaire de l’article «Parsing reward» m’a 
amenée à écrire cet essai. Ce commentaire fut rejeté par l’éditeur d’un prestigieux journal scientifique dans le domaine des 
neurosciences comportementales avec la suggestion qu’il serait plus approprié à une «discussion de comptoir». Je pense que 
les questions essentielles abordées dans cette note sont cruciales pour un débat sur la frontière entre sciences humaines et 
biologiques. Les protagonistes impliqués dans cet incident didactique  , dont j’ai suivi les publications et les livres au fil des 
années, sont des leaders dans le domaine des neurosciences. Dans cet essai, après l’avoir remise dans son contexte historique, 
je discute les potentiels apports de cette note aux domaines de l’éthologie, de la psychologie et des neurosciences. 
Mots-clés: émotion, animaux, éthologie, psychologie, neurosciences.
Reflexiones a partir de una nota a pie de página: implicaciones para el estudio de las emociones en animales 
Resumen: Una nota a pie de página, presentada originalmente cómo un comentario al artículo “Parsing Reward”, me llevó 
a escribir este ensayo. El comentario fue rechazado por un editor de un renombrado periódico científico en el área de las 
neurociencias, con la sugerencia de que sería más apropiado para una “conversación de bar”. Creo que las cuestiones esenciales 
envueltas son significativas para un debate en la zona fronteriza de las ciencias humanas y biológicas. Los protagonistas 
envueltos en el didáctico episodio de la nota, cuyos artículos y libros he seguido en los últimos años, son líderes en el área de 
las neurociencias. En este ensayo contextualizo el episodio históricamente y lo discuto en términos de potenciales perspectivas 
para la etología, la psicología y la neurociencia.
Palabras clave: emoción, animales, etología, psicología, neurociencia.  
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